

# **“Eco-Labeling and the Gains from Agricultural and Food Trade: A Ricardian Approach”**

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# Motivation

- Analysis of agricultural system should recognize extent of vertical product differentiation, e.g., environmental claims (Sexton, 2013)
- Eco-labeling key to resolving information asymmetry associated with environmental *credence* goods
- Rapid growth of eco-labeling relating to food and agricultural products since 1970s (Gruère, 2013)
- Trade often expected to generate negative externalities (Copeland and Taylor, 2004)
- However, if production generates environmental benefits, eco-labeling beneficial (Swinnen, 2015)

# Outline

- Develop Ricardian-type model drawing on Eaton and Kortum (2002), and others including, *inter alia*, Waugh (2010), Fieler (2011), Levchenko and Zhang (2014)
- Class of model already applied to agricultural trade by Reimer and Li (2010), Reimer (2015), and Heerman *et al.* (2015)
- Use to derive comparative statics concerning impact of labeling of and trade in eco-friendly products
- Lay out “recipe” for calibrating model, and initial estimation of gravity equation

# Modern Ricardian Approach

- **Difficult to adapt Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977) to multi-country setting**
- **Contribution of Eaton and Kortum (2002): focus on parameters of productivity distribution**
- **Given country will be more productive than others at producing range of goods in continuum – generates reason for trade**
- **Generates gravity-like structure between share of spending on imports and trade costs (Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare, 2012)**

# Model

- $I$  countries trade products  $j$ , produced along continuum, producers having access to  $LC$  and  $EF$ :

$$q_i^{LC}(j) = z_i(j)L_i$$
$$q_i^{EF}(j) = z_i(j)L_i^\alpha H_i^{1-\alpha}$$

- $z_i(j)$  distributed independently as Fréchet:

$$F_i(z) = \exp\{-T_i z^{-\theta}\}$$

- Prices offered by exporter  $i$  in  $n$ :

$$p_{ni}^{LC}(j) = \frac{r_i \tau_{ni}}{z_i(j)} \quad p_{ni}^{EF}(j) = \frac{\kappa r_i^\alpha w_i^{1-\alpha} \tau_{ni} \zeta_{ni}}{z_i(j)}$$

# Model

- Consumers in  $n$  buy  $LC$  and  $EF$  products at lowest price on offer:

$$p_n^k(j) = \min_i \{p_{ni}^k(j)\}$$

- Productivity distribution used to derive distributions of  $EF$  price offers by  $i$  in  $n$ , and prices of  $EF$  products offered in  $n$  :

$$G_{ni}^{EF}(p) = 1 - \exp \left\{ -T_i \left( \kappa r_i^\alpha w_i^{1-\alpha} \tau_{ni} \zeta_{ni} \right)^{-\theta} p^\theta \right\}$$

$$G_n^{EF}(p) = 1 - \exp \left\{ -\Phi_n^{EF} p^\theta \right\}$$

$$\text{where: } \Phi_n^{EF} = \sum_{l=1}^L T_l \left( \kappa r_l^\alpha w_l^{1-\alpha} \tau_{nl} \zeta_{nl} \right)^{-\theta}$$

# Model

- Setting  $\alpha = \zeta_{ni} = 1$  :

$$G_{ni}^{LC}(p) = 1 - \exp\{-T_i(r_i\tau_{ni})^{-\theta}p^{\theta}\}$$

$$G_n^{LC}(p) = 1 - \exp\{-\Phi_n^{LC}p^{\theta}\}$$

where:  $\Phi_n^{LC} = \sum_{l=1}^L T_l(r_l\tau_{nl})^{-\theta}$

- $\Phi_n^k$ ,  $k=EF,LC$  describe how average productivity, input costs, trade and labeling costs around world affect prices of each type of good in each import market
- Lower trade costs allow consumption with smaller environmental impact, even without reallocation of consumption to *EF* products

# Model

- Using price distributions, probability  $i$  offers lowest prices of  $EF$  and  $LC$  products in  $n$ :

$$\pi_{ni}^{EF} = \frac{T_i(\kappa r_i^\alpha w_i^{1-\alpha} \tau_{ni} \zeta_{ni})^{-\theta}}{\Phi_n^{EF}}$$

$$\pi_{ni}^{LC} = \frac{T_i(r_i \tau_{ni})^{-\theta}}{\Phi_n^{LC}}$$

- With continuum, these are also fraction of products that consumers in  $n$  purchase from  $i$ :

$$\frac{X_{ni}^k}{X_n^k} = \frac{\pi_{ni}^k \int_0^1 Q^k(j) dj \int_0^\infty p dG_n^k(p)}{\int_0^1 Q^k(j) dj \int_0^\infty p dG_n^k(p)} \equiv \pi_{ni}^k \quad (1)$$



# Model

- Consumers have preferences over products, choosing *EF* and *LC* to maximize:

$$\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \left( \int_0^1 q_i^{LC}(j)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} dj + \omega_i^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \int_0^1 q_i^{EF}(j)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} dj \right)$$

- Implies total expenditure on *EF* relative to *LC*:

$$\frac{X_i^{EF}}{X_i^{LC}} = \omega_i \left( \frac{P_i^{EF}}{P_i^{LC}} \right)^{1-\sigma}$$

$P_i^k$  is CES price index,  $P_i^k = \gamma \Phi_n^k^{-1/\theta}$ ,  $k = LC, EF$  – consumers only choose *EF* if labeled

# Comparative Statics: Labeling

■ Labeling increases *EF* trade flows:

(i) Labeling increases share of *EF* expenditure on imports:

$$\pi_{nn}^{EF} = \frac{T_n(\kappa r_n^\alpha w_n^{1-\alpha})^{-\theta}}{\Phi_n^{EF}} = \frac{T_n(\kappa r_n^\alpha w_n^{1-\alpha})^{-\theta}}{\sum_{l=1}^I T_l(\kappa r_l^\alpha w_l^{1-\alpha} \tau_{nl} \zeta_{nl})^{-\theta}}$$

Without labeling  $\zeta_{ni} = \infty$ , consumers do not recognize imported *EF* as distinct from *LC* products, therefore:

$$\Phi_n^{EF} = T_n(\kappa r_n^\alpha w_n^{1-\alpha})^{-\theta} \text{ and } \pi_{nn}^{EF} = 1$$

As labeling costs fall,  $\Phi_n^{EF}$  increases and  $\pi_{nn}^{EF}$  falls, i.e., import share of expenditure on *EF* products rises

# Comparative Statics: Labeling

(ii) Labeling increases share of total expenditure allocated to *EF* products:

By definition,  $X_i = X_i^{EF} + X_i^{LC}$ , therefore:

$$\frac{X_i^{EF}}{X_i} = \frac{\omega_i (p_i^{EF} / p_i^{LC})^{1-\sigma}}{1 + \omega_i (p_i^{EF} / p_i^{LC})^{1-\sigma}}$$

Recall  $p_n^{EF} = \gamma \Phi_n^{EF-1/\theta}$ , so lower labeling costs implies lower prices for *EF* products

Therefore, since lower labeling costs have no impact on  $\Phi_n^{LC}$ , introducing *EF* labels lowers  $(p_i^{EF} / p_i^{LC})$

# Comparative Statics: Land and *EF*

- Optimal land allocation implies:

$$\frac{L_i^{EF}}{L_i^{LC}} = \frac{\sum_n \pi_{ni}^{EF} X_n^{EF}}{\sum_n \pi_{ni}^{LC} (X_n - X_n^{EF})}$$

Already established that  $\pi_{ni}^{EF}$  increases with eco – labeling, as does share of expenditure allocated to *EF*

$X_n - X_n^{EF}$  is also decreasing in import markets where labeling of *i*'s *EF* products is introduced

Therefore, share of land allocated to *EF* production increases for exporter *i*

# Comparative Statics: Mutual recognition

- Recognition of  $i$ 's labeling in  $n$  implies:

$$\pi_{ni}^{EF} = \frac{T_i(\kappa r_i^\alpha w_i^{1-\alpha} \tau_{ni})^{-\theta}}{\Phi_n^{EF}}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi_n^{EF} &= T_n(\kappa r_n^\alpha w_n^{1-\alpha})^{-\theta} + T_i(\kappa r_i^\alpha w_i^{1-\alpha} \tau_{ni})^{-\theta} \\ &+ \sum_{l \neq i, n} T_l(\kappa r_l^\alpha w_l^{1-\alpha} \tau_{nl} \zeta_{nl})^{-\theta} \end{aligned}$$

$\Phi_n^{EF}$  increases, and given:

$$\frac{\Phi_n^{EF}}{\Phi_n^{LC}} = \left( \frac{p_i^{EF}}{p_i^{LC}} \right)^{-\theta}$$

Relative price of  $EF$  products declines,  $EF$  trade flows increase for fixed level of expenditure

# Model: Solution and parameterization

- Given  $T_i$ ,  $\tau_{ni}$ ,  $\zeta_{ni}$ ,  $H_i$  and  $\omega_i$ , equilibrium is  $r_i$ ,  $w_i$ ,  $\pi_{ni}^{LC}$ ,  $\pi_{ni}^{EF}$ ,  $X_i^{LC}$ ,  $X_i^{EF}$  and  $L_i^{LC}$ ,  $L_i^{EF}$ , such that input markets clear and trade is balanced
- Solve for *LC*-type equilibrium variables, obtaining land rental rate  $r_i$ , and then solve for equilibrium  $w_i$ , and *EF*-type equilibrium values
- Parameterization/calibration requires values for  $T_i$ ,  $\theta$ ,  $\tau_{ni}$ ,  $\zeta_{ni}$ ,  $\sigma$ , and  $\omega_i$
- Standard approach: log-linearize (1) and estimate gravity-like equation to get,  $T_i$ , and  $\tau_{ni}$ , use values of  $\theta$  and  $\sigma$  from literature, and solve for  $\zeta_{ni}$  and  $\omega_i$

# Model: Solution and parameterization

**Table 1: Key Parameters**

$\alpha$	Land's value-added share in organic production (1-average labor share of value-added)	0.65 (OECD, 2009)
$w_i$	Solve out assuming $H_i=1$ for all countries	Calibrate
$r_i$	Country's agricultural output/hectare of arable land	World Bank (2012)
$T_i$	Mean parameter for productivity distribution	Estimate
$\theta$	Dispersion parameter for productivity distribution	2.83 (Reimer and Li, 2010)
$\tau_{ni}$	Bilateral trade costs	Estimate
$\zeta_{ni}$	Organic labeling costs in market $n$ in excess of exporter $i$ 's labeling costs	Calibrate
$\sigma$	Elasticity of substitution	1.5 (Ruhl, 2008)
$\omega_i$	Consumer love of sustainability	Calibrate

# Model: Solution and parameterization

- Normalize  $\pi_{ni}^{LC}$  by  $\pi_{nn}^{LC}$ :

$$\frac{\pi_{ni}^{LC}}{\pi_{nn}^{LC}} = \frac{X_{ni}^{LC}}{X_{nn}^{LC}} = \frac{T_i (r_i \tau_{ni})^{-\theta}}{T_n (r_n)^{-\theta}} = \frac{T_i}{T_n} \left( \frac{r_i}{r_n} \right)^{-\theta} \tau_{ni}^{-\theta}$$

and taking the log:

$$\ln \left( \frac{X_{ni}^{LC}}{X_{nn}^{LC}} \right) = \ln \frac{T_i}{T_n} - \theta \ln \frac{r_i}{r_n} - \theta \ln \tau_{ni}$$

- Following Reimer and Li (2010), define:

$$S_i = \ln(T_i) - \theta \ln(r_i)$$



# Model: Solution and parameterization

- Substituting  $S_i$  in for  $T_i$ :

$$\ln\left(\frac{X_{ni}^{LC}}{X_{nn}^{LC}}\right) = -\theta \ln \tau_{ni} + S_i - S_n$$

- Gravity-like structural relationship in  $LC$ :

$$\ln\left(\frac{X_{ni}^{LC}}{X_{nn}^{LC}}\right) = S_i - \theta \left( b_{ni} + l_{ni} + RTA_{ni} + \sum_c d_{cni} + ex_i \right) - S_n$$

where:

$$-\theta \ln(\tau_{ni}) = b_{ni} + l_{ni} + RTA_{ni} + \sum_c d_{cni} + ex_i + \xi_{ni}$$

# Gravity Equation Estimates


Variable	2010		2013	
D1 (0,375)	-12.71***	(0.50)	-12.92***	(0.45)
D2 (375,750)	-14.99***	(0.30)	-14.41***	(0.28)
D3 (750, 1500)	-17.92***	(0.20)	-17.34***	(0.20)
D4 (1500, 3000)	-19.75***	(0.14)	-19.28***	(0.15)
D5 (3000, 6000)	-20.92***	(0.08)	-20.82***	(0.09)
D6 (6000, max)	-21.30***	(0.17)	-21.33***	(0.12)
Border	1.30***	(0.45)	1.01***	(0.41)
Language	1.35***	(0.18)	1.30***	(0.19)
RTA	2.88***	(0.21)	3.35***	(0.21)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.51		0.53	
Sample-size	11,955		12,099	

\*\*\* Significant at 1 percent level

$\ln T_i (2010, \theta=2.83)$



$$\ln T_i (2013, \theta=2.83)$$



# Next Steps

- Use parameterized model to evaluate impact of alternative eco-labelling policies:
  - Mutual recognition
  - Regulatory harmonization
- Allow for non-homothetic preferences to explore impact of income differences across  $i$  (Fieler, 2011), i.e., North vs. South and differing standards
- Introduce explicit environmental damage function
- Use pesticide standards to pin down weight  $\omega_i$  on consumer preferences in utility function