Why Regulate Shadow Banking?

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Bank Capital Requirements

- 2010 Dodd-Frank Act did not mandate specific levels for banks’ capital requirements – left it to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

- September 2010 – Basel III:
  - minimum equity capital set at 7% of assets
  - counter-cyclical buffer of up to 2.5% of assets imposed by regulators during “good times”

- “Basel III is much tougher than Basel II...implies the bankers’ incentive to game the system is even greater than before...” (Financial Times, 9/21/2010)
Financial Crisis and Banking

- Financial crisis triggered by “systemic event” – increase in subprime mortgage defaults
- Caused bank run in “shadow-banking” sector – forced rescues (Bear Stearns) and bankruptcies (Lehman Brothers)
- Pre-1930s, bank runs occurred when depositors sought to withdraw cash en masse
- Collapse of liquidity in recent crisis due to run on repurchase market - rise in price of “haircuts” and cessation of “repo” lending on certain collateral
Shadow Banking

- Issuance of short-term money market instruments (repo) based on asset backed securities (ABS)
- Players: broker-dealers, structured investment vehicles, and money market mutual funds (MMMFs)
- 2010 – liabilities of $16 trillion
- Evolved over past 40 years due to:
  - competition – MMMFs and junk bonds
  - regulatory change – repeal of Glass-Steagall Act
  - innovation – derivatives and securitization
Shadow Banking

Investors (MMMFs) → Shares → Retail Investors

Securitization through SPVs

ABS

Collateral

Repo Agreements

Banks → Loans → Borrowers

Key:
- ABS = asset-backed securities
- MMMFs = money market mutual funds
- SPVs = Special Purpose Vehicles

Source: Gorton and Metrick (2010)
Securitization

- Loan originators can sell claims to cash flows
- Multiple loans “pooled”, and assembled off-balance sheet in a trust - Special Purpose Vehicle
- Pool of loans “tranched” – designation of classes of claimants on cash-flows, i.e., AAA through to BBB

Example: 100 loans in pool, BBB tranche loses money if 1 loan not repaid, AAA tranche only loses if all 100 loans not repaid

- ABS sold to capital market to finance purchase of cash flows from originator or used as collateral in repo agreements
Why Securitization?

- **Benign Story:**

  Securitization spreads risks across a wider range of investors – lowers lending costs.

  Also, if securitization done properly, senior tranches of ABS relatively easy for non-specialized investors to evaluate – expands buyer-base.

- **“Regulatory Arbitrage” Story:**

  Rules on bank capital requirements, i.e., 1988 Basel I provisions, avoided via off-balance-sheet vehicles.
Repo Agreements

- With cap on deposit insurance, large institutions have no access to safe short-term investments
- In repo market, Bear Stearns sells assets (collateral) to Fidelity for $5m, and buys assets back at $5.1m, where \((5.5-5)/5 = 10\%\) is “repo rate”
- Investor keeps collateral if bank defaults on promise to repurchase
- Amount investor deposits with bank typically less than value of asset, i.e., there is a “haircut”, e.g., if bank sells asset worth $2m for $1.6m, “haircut” = 20\%
The Run on Repo

- 2007, investors became concerned about quality of ABS and began to pull back on short-term lending – causing run on repo, with sharp increase in haircuts
- If borrower has $1 billion of ABS, and haircuts rise from 2% to 50%, equivalent to deposits falling from $980 to $500 million
- Borrowers forced to liquidate ABS, depressing prices via “fire-sale” effect, reducing value as collateral, and causing further pullback in short-term lending
- Liquidity crisis eventually backstopped by Federal Reserve after Lehman’s collapse
The Run on Repo

Source: Gorton and Metrick (2010)
Shadow Banking Regulation

- Shadow banking ought to be regulated as it is a new form of banking with same vulnerabilities as traditional banking.

- What might regulation consist of?
  - the “Good”: independent of market conditions, minimum haircuts should be charged
  - the “Bad”: expansion of federal safety nets
  - the “Maybe”: limiting creation of “pseudo-riskless” securities

* Stein (2010)
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