US Comparative Advantage in Bioenergy:

A Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardian Approach

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Motivation/outline

- Brazil currently has comparative advantage in producing ethanol (Kojima et al., 2007; Elobeid and Tokgoz, 2006)
- What will happen with innovation in production technology?
- Allow for possibility US becomes an exporter of ethanol
- Draw on Hecksher-Ohlin-Ricardo model (Davis, 1995), and trade in presence of external economies (Helpman and Krugman, 1985)
- Consider implications for US policy towards ethanol

Trade in ethanol

- Basic model assumes:
 - 2 countries: US and ROW (includes Brazil)
 - 2 factors of production: capital and land
 - 3 goods: 1 capital-intensive, 2/3 land-intensive
 - 2/3 substitutes in consumption (fuel-blending), 2 using land embodied in sugarcane, 3 using land embodied in corn
- CRS technologies same across countries
- Preferences homothetic
- Initial equilibrium in Figure 1 factor employment vectors for 2/3 combined – avoids dimensionality problem (Dixit and Norman, 1980)




Figure 1. Comparative advantage and trade in ethanol

Technological change

- Introduce good 4:
 - ethanol produced from cellulosic feedstock
 - capital-intensive
 - US has technical advantage in producing 4
- Equilibrium in Figure 2:
 - US exporter of capital-intensive 1, and specializes in 4
 - ROW has comparative advantage in 2/3
- To rationalize US exporting 4 importing 2/3, requires more structure on demand (Flamm and Helpman, 1987)




Figure 2. Specialization and trade in ethanol

External economies

- If US has head-start in 4, but technology subject to external economies of scale:
 - industry operates under industry-specific IRS
- Similar equilibrium to Figure 2 (Helpman and Krugman, 1985)
 - US specializes in 4, and has comparative advantage in 1
 - ROW has comparative advantage in 2/3
- Gains from trade if there is expansion in production of 4 (Kemp and Negishi, 1970)

Policy and trade in ethanol

- Previous model assumes external economies realized
- Ignores market failure, i.e., learning economies are external, firms under-producing 4 due to spillovers
- Possibly an argument for temporary protection of 4 through first-best subsidy (Bardhan, 1971)
- Current policies encouraging investment in 3, may stymie investment in 4, i.e., even if technology is available, instantaneous returns from 3 greater than those from 4 (Sauré, 2007)
- As well as static deadweight losses from current corn-based ethanol policies, may be future losses due to failure to realize dynamic learning economies in cellulosic-based ethanol