“How to Make a Good Presentation”

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Overview

- Putting the presentation together
- Making the presentation
- After the presentation

Putting the presentation together

- Think about setting/audience
- Limit number of slides
- Use simple bullet points on each slide:
  - easy to follow
  - prompts for you as speaker
- Use clear fonts, and keep bullets short
- Have a pdf version of presentation!

Putting the presentation together

- Clear outline of paper being presented:

  - motivation
  - previous literature
  - objective of research
  - the “bottom line”

- Succinct description of model being used

- Provide statement of key results

- Conclusions and future research

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Making the presentation

- Set/check ground-rules with moderator
- Adapt pace of talk to time constraints
- Relax and engage audience
- Ensure everyone can see screen
- Follow time-signals from moderator
- If time is running out - summarize

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Some typical pitfalls……

- Garish slides!
- Slides based on actual pages of the paper
- Excessive use of mathematics
- Too many slides
- Tables of econometric results in small font

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Econometric Model and Results

- Fixed Effects ML Poisson method
- Lots of data
- Econometric problems
- Useless results
- Need to start again. . . . . .

The world price for trade between the home country and foreign country i is $p^{wi} \equiv p_x^{*i}/p_y$. Notice that p^{wi} is thus foreign country i's terms of trade. Defining $\tau \equiv 1+t$ and $\tau^{*i} \equiv 1+t^{*i}$, we have that $p = \tau p^{wi}$ and $p^{*i} = (1/\tau^{*i})p^{wi}$. Since the home country applies a non-discriminatory tariff, we thus see that $p^{w1} = p^{w2} \equiv p^w$; that is, the two foreign countries must share the same terms of trade when the home country adopts an MFN tariff policy. We thus have that $p = \tau p^w$ and $p^{*i} = (1/\tau^{*i})p^w$. Finally, we note that the home country's terms of trade in this MFN setting is given as $1/p^w$.

In a given country, once the local and world prices are determined, all economic quantities (production, consumption, tariff revenue, imports, exports) are also determined. In turn, for a given set of tariffs, $(\tau, \tau^{*1}, \tau^{*2})$, once we determine a market-clearing world price, $\tilde{p}^w(\tau, \tau^{*1}, \tau^{*2})$, then all local prices are determined. This follows since the pricing relationships just presented then yield the local prices as $p(\tau, \tilde{p}^w) = \tau \tilde{p}^w$ and $p^{*i}(\tau^{*i}, \tilde{p}^w) = (1/\tau^{*i})\tilde{p}^w$, respectively. Finally, the market-clearing world price is determined as the world price which ensures that the home-country imports of good x equals the sum of exports of good x from foreign countries 1 and 2; in other words, $\tilde{p}^w(\tau, \tau^{*1}, \tau^{*2})$ is the value for p^w which solves

$$M(p(\tau, p^w), p^w) = E^{*1}(p^{*1}(\tau^{*1}, p^w), p^w) + E^{*2}(p^{*2}(\tau^{*2}, p^w), p^w). \tag{1}$$

As is standard, for each country, we assume as well that import and export functions are defined in a manner that satisfies trade balance requirements:

$$\begin{aligned} p^w M(p, p^w) &= E(p, p^w) \\ M^{*i}(p^{*i}, p^w) &= p^w E^{*i}(p^{*i}, p^w) \text{ for } i = 1, 2, \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where $E(p, p^w)$ denotes home-country exports of good y and $M^{*i}(p^{*i}, p^w)$ represents foreign-country-i imports of good y. The market-clearing requirement for good y is then implied by (1) and (2).

Source: Bagwell and Staiger, 2012

The First-Order Conditions

My math is awesome!!!

- Differentiating

$$\log A_t = (1-\rho)\log A^* + \rho \log A_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$

$$\begin{aligned} L \quad = \quad & E_t \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^i \left[U(C_{t+i}) - V(N_{t+i}) \right] \\ & + E_t \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^i \lambda_{t+i} \left[A_{t+i} K_{t+i-1}^{\alpha} N_{t+i}^{1-\alpha} + (1-\delta) K_{t+i-1} - C_{t+i} - K_{t+i} \right] \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} U(C_t) - V(N_t) + \lambda_t \left(A_t K_{t-1}^{\alpha} N_t^{1-\alpha} - C_t - K_t + (1-\delta) K_{t-1} \right) \\ + \beta E_t \left[\lambda_{t+1} \left(A_{t+1} K_t^{\alpha} N_{t+1}^{1-\alpha} + (1-\delta) K_t \right) \right] \end{aligned}$$

- We get following first-order conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial L}{\partial C_t} \quad &: \quad U'(C_t) - \lambda_t = 0 \\ \frac{\partial L}{\partial K_t} \quad &: \quad -\lambda_t + \beta E_t \left[\lambda_{t+1} \left(\alpha \frac{Y_{t+1}}{K_t} + 1 - \delta \right) \right] = 0 \\ \frac{\partial L}{\partial N_t} \quad &: \quad -V'(N_t) + (1-\alpha) \lambda_t \frac{Y_t}{N_t} = 0 \\ \frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda_t} \quad &: \quad A_t K_{t-1}^{\alpha} N_t^{1-\alpha} - C_t - K_t + (1-\delta) K_{t-1} = 0 \end{aligned}$$

Table 5
The determinants of SO_2, CO_2, and BOD emissions per capita (differenced GMM).

Variable	SO_2 (Protocol)	SO_2	CO_2 (Protocol)	CO_2	BOD (Protocol)	BOD
$\ln E_{it-1}$	0.67***	0.68***	0.60***	0.60***	0.57***	0.58***
	(70.81)	(90.02)	(31.72)	(28.38)	(26.73)	(21.52)
S	1.10***	1.11***	0.82***	0.84***	−0.79***	−0.95***
	(7.82)	(7.77)	(6.95)	(6.21)	(−4.91)	(−6.96)
S^2	−0.907***	−0.96***	−0.43***	−0.42***	−0.20**	−0.14*
	(−8.33)	(−15.62)	(−5.47)	(−4.63)	(−2.02)	(−1.94)
K/L	0.013	0.028	0.079**	0.078**	0.17***	0.22***
	(0.32)	(0.7)	(2.13)	(2.17)	(4.91)	(7.24)
$(K/L)^2$	−0.031***	−0.033***	−0.014***	−0.013***	−0.043***	−0.045***
	(−3.66)	(−5.56)	(−3.52)	(−3.63)	(−10.57)	(−9.81)
$(K/L)S$	0.27***	0.28***	0.095***	0.089***	0.21***	0.20***
	(5.22)	(8.94)	(3.16)	(2.72)	(6.1)	(6.76)
T	0.0014***	0.0018***	0.0024***	0.0026***	0.0005	0.00050*
	(4.33)	(7.96)	(14.41)	(20.93)	(1.43)	(1.9)
T relative (K/L)	−0.0013*	−0.0016**	−0.0014***	−0.0014**	−0.0039***	−0.0048***
	(−1.66)	(−2.37)	(−2.65)	(−2.55)	(−5.77)	(−6.41)
T relative $(K/L)^2$	0.0011***	0.0011***	0.00066***	0.00064***	0.0017***	0.0019***
	(4.19)	(6.12)	(5.92)	(6.42)	(6.32)	(5.99)
T relative S	−0.0010*	−0.0011**	−0.00059*	−0.00065*	0.0018***	0.0023***
	(−1.79)	(−2.27)	(−1.83)	(−1.76)	(4.24)	(5.45)
T relative S^2	0.00074***	0.00075***	0.00037***	0.00036***	0.00023**	0.00017***
	(8.01)	(12.18)	(4.6)	(4.21)	(2.11)	(3.13)
T rel (K/L) rel S	−0.0015***	−0.0015***	−0.00077***	−0.00074***	−0.0013***	−0.0013***
	(−6.07)	(−11.00)	(−4.49)	(−4.48)	(−5.14)	(−6.07)
Helsinki Protocol	−0.097***	–	–	–	–	–
	(−4.01)					
Oslo Protocol	−0.040***	–	–	–	–	–
	(−2.93)					
Kyoto Protocol	–	–	−0.0025	–	–	–
			(−0.60)			
Protocol on Water and Health	–	–	–	–	−0.010	–
					(−1.20)	
Constant	−0.0067***	−0.0067***	0.0012***	0.0010***	−0.0014**	−0.0010
	(−11.22)	(−9.06)	(3.14)	(3.27)	(−2.55)	(−1.41)
Observations	2152	2152	2152	2152	1159	1159
Number of countries	88	88	88	88	83	83
Sargan test	76.29	75.99	76.27	79.84	70.39	67.46
AR(1)	−4.41***	−4.44***	−3.45***	−3.52***	−3.27***	−3.38***
AR(2)	−0.01	−0.02	−0.94	−0.94	1.74*	1.75*

Note: Values in parentheses are t-values. *, ** and *** indicate "significant" at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level, respectively. Trade openness, per capita GDP, and its square term are instrumented for using predicted openness, predicted per capita GDP, and predicted its square term, respectively.

Source: Managi et al. (2009)

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After the Presentation

- Answer audience questions succinctly
- No bluffing……
- Finish when moderator says you are done
- Thank audience
- Stay for other speakers
- Engage audience members afterwards