

The Trade Outlook: Where Are We Headed?

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
Global Economic Outlook

- ◆ **Over past year, broad-based slowdown in global economy in terms of industrial production and trade (Figure 1)**
- ◆ **Driven by:**
 - **Downturn in auto production and sales**
 - **Weak business confidence due to US-China trade war**
 - **Slowdown in Chinese economy**
- ◆ **Slowdown in industrial production has fed into decline in trade growth (Figure 2)**

Industrial Production and Trade


Figure 1

(Year-over-year % change)



Source: IMF, October 2019

Contributions to Global Imports




Source: IMF, October 2019

Risks Skewed to Downside


- ◆ **Risks: (i) disruptions to trade/supply chains, (ii) declines in risk appetite/flight to safe assets, (iii) political uncertainty and conflict**
- ◆ **IMF forecasts that if US-China trade war were to continue, cost to global economy of \$700 billion by end of 2020**
- ◆ **Both US and China affected by ratcheting up of trade war (Figures 3 and 4)**
- ◆ **View of IMF, World Bank and others: reduce trade tensions and return to solving issues via multilateral system, i.e., WTO**

Impact on Real US GDP



Source: IMF, October 2019

Impact on Real Chinese GDP



Source: IMF, October 2019

Context: US-China Trade Issues

- ◇ **Tensions have risen over Chinese trade and economic policies – key reason for current trade war:**
 - **Extensive network of industrial policies that protect domestic sectors/firms – especially state-owned enterprises (SOEs)**
 - **Failure to provide protection for intellectual property rights (IPRs) and forced technology transfer**
 - **China has not met all obligations since accession to World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001**
 - **Government-directed financial policies promoting high savings (low private consumption), investment (creating excess capacity), and exchange rate policy**

Phase One Trade Deal with China

- ◆ **USTR Fact Sheet (December 13, 2019) outlines 7 chapters of Phase One Trade Deal:**
 - ***Intellectual Property:* commitment by China to prevent theft of IPRs**
 - ***Technology Transfer:* commitment by China to stop forced transfer of technology as condition of market access**
 - ***Agriculture:* removal of non-tariff barriers on US products such as meat and poultry**
 - ***Financial Services:* removal of barriers to US providers of financial services**

Phase One Trade Deal with China

- ***Currency:*** commitments by China to refrain from competitive devaluation of RMB, and to promote transparency in accounting
- ***Expanding Trade:*** China has committed to expanding imports of goods and services from US by \$200 billion/annum over next two years
Specific commitment to increase agricultural imports to \$40 billion/annum by 2020
- ***Dispute Resolution:*** arrangement to ensure effective implementation of agreement and timely resolution of bilateral disputes

Tariff Commitments

◇ US actions on tariffs:

- **15% tariffs on \$162 billion of imports, scheduled for December 15, not imposed**
- **Tariffs on \$100 billion of imports imposed on September 1, 2019 will be reduced to 7.5%**
- **25% tariffs on \$250 billion introduced in 2018 will remain in place**

◇ China's actions on tariffs:

- **Will not impose retaliatory tariffs due on December 15**

Assessment of Deal

◆ Tariffs:


- **Pause in tariff escalation – but no removal of existing tariffs**
- **Average US tariff remains at 19.3%, covering 65% of imports from China**
- **Average Chinese tariff remains at 20.9% covering 57% of imports from US**

◆ Overall Import Commitments by China:

- **Increasing imports of goods and services up to \$200 billion/annum seems inconsistent with China maintaining its tariffs**

Pause in Tariff Escalation

Figure 5



Assessment of Deal

◆ **Agricultural Import Commitments by China:**

- **If met, would be significant boost to US agriculture – dwarfing forecast benefits of USMCA (\$2.2 billion/annum increase in exports, USITC, 2019)**
- **Should be put in context: prior to trade war, China imported \$24 billion in 2017, and record of \$29.6 billion in 2013 (USDA)**
- **However, raises several questions:**
 - (i) Chinese reliance on SOEs to meet commitments**
 - (ii) Skepticism US can export this much in a year**
 - (iii) Significant diversion of imports from Brazil to US - could result in WTO dispute**

What's Missing?

- ❖ **No mention of China's use of subsidies and role of SOEs – key to trade war starting in first place**
- ❖ **Talk of additional phases of US-China trade deal probably too optimistic on this issue**
- ❖ **Chinese economy structured in ways not anticipated by WTO (Wu, 2016)**
- ❖ **WTO rules on subsidies have significant shortcomings that have been highlighted by China's economic model (Bown and Hillman, October 22, 2019)**

“China, Inc.”

- ◆ **Party controls economy while still taking advantage of benefits of market mechanism, i.e., control is not necessarily directly via state:**
 - **Party controls “commanding heights” of economy**
 - **Party controls and directs largest banks**
 - **Party coordinates government agencies and firms**
 - **Party-set performance metrics of SOEs, banks etc.**
 - **Informal linkages between Party and private firms**
- ◆ **Subsidies to Chinese firms are opaque rather than explicitly targeted by the state**

Improving WTO Subsidy Rules

- ◆ **Key reforms required to WTO subsidy rules (Bown and Hillman, PIIE, October 2019):**
 - **Redefine what counts as a subsidy given Chinese economic model**
 - **Burden-of-proof needs reversing, i.e., China should have to show its subsidies are benign**
 - **New system of enforcement required, i.e., anti-dumping policies ineffective**
- ◆ **A coalition of WTO members would likely be more appropriate way to deal with “China Inc.” (Hillman, June 2018)**

Conclusions

- ❖ **Trade war has already imposed costs on US, which will only be partially reduced with Phase One Trade Deal, i.e., tariffs still in place**
- ❖ **Deal rather “shallow”, i.e., targeted at US-China bilateral trade deficit, with no focus on Chinese subsidies and SOEs**
- ❖ **A coalition of countries probably a better way to deal with China’s violation of WTO rules**
- ❖ **Failure of US to follow rules-based trading system (WTO) runs risk China will not follow system if (when) it becomes dominant economic power**