

“How to Make a Good Presentation”

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Overview

- **Putting the presentation together**
- **Making the presentation**
- **After the presentation**

Putting the presentation together

- Think about setting/audience
- Limit number of slides
- Use simple bullet points on each slide:
 - easy to follow
 - prompts for you as speaker
- Use clear fonts, and keep bullets short
- Have a pdf version of presentation!

Putting the presentation together

- **Clear outline of paper being presented:**
 - motivation
 - previous literature
 - objective of research
 - the “bottom line”
- **Succinct description of model being used**
- **Provide statement of key results**
- **Conclusions and future research**

Making the presentation

- **Set/check ground-rules with moderator**
- **Adapt pace of talk to time constraints**
- **Relax and engage audience**
- **Ensure everyone can see screen**
- **Follow time-signals from moderator**
- **If time is running out - summarize**

Some typical pitfalls.....

- **Garish slides!**
- **Slides based on actual pages of the paper**
- **Excessive use of mathematics**
- **Too many slides**
- **Tables of econometric results in small font**

Econometric Models and Results

- *Fixed Effects ML Poisson method*
- *Lots of data*
- *Econometric problems*
- *Useless results*
- *Need to start again.....*



The world price for trade between the home country and foreign country i is $p^{wt} \equiv p_x^{*i}/p_y$. Notice that p^{wt} is thus foreign country i 's terms of trade. Defining $\tau \equiv 1 + t$ and $\tau^{*i} \equiv 1 + t^{*i}$, we have that $p = \tau p^{wt}$ and $p^{*i} = (1/\tau^{*i})p^{wt}$. Since the home country applies a non-discriminatory tariff, we thus see that $p^{w1} = p^{w2} \equiv p^w$; that is, the two foreign countries must share the same terms of trade when the home country adopts an MFN tariff policy. We thus have that $p = \tau p^w$ and $p^{*i} = (1/\tau^{*i})p^w$. Finally, we note that the home country's terms of trade in this MFN setting is given as $1/p^w$.

In a given country, once the local and world prices are determined, all economic quantities (production, consumption, tariff revenue, imports, exports) are also determined. In turn, for a given set of tariffs, $(\tau, \tau^{*1}, \tau^{*2})$, once we determine a market-clearing world price, $\hat{p}^w(\tau, \tau^{*1}, \tau^{*2})$, then all local prices are determined. This follows since the pricing relationships just presented then yield the local prices as $p(\tau, \hat{p}^w) = \tau \hat{p}^w$ and $p^{*i}(\tau^{*i}, \hat{p}^w) = (1/\tau^{*i})\hat{p}^w$, respectively. Finally, the market-clearing world price is determined as the world price which ensures that the home-country imports of good x equals the sum of exports of good x from foreign countries 1 and 2; in other words, $\hat{p}^w(\tau, \tau^{*1}, \tau^{*2})$ is the value for p^w which solves

$$M(p(\tau, p^w), p^w) = E^{*1}(p^{*1}(\tau^{*1}, p^w), p^w) + E^{*2}(p^{*2}(\tau^{*2}, p^w), p^w). \quad (1)$$

As is standard, for each country, we assume as well that import and export functions are defined in a manner that satisfies trade balance requirements:

$$\begin{aligned} p^w M(p, p^w) &= E(p, p^w) \\ M^{*i}(p^{*i}, p^w) &= p^w E^{*i}(p^{*i}, p^w) \text{ for } i = 1, 2, \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where $E(p, p^w)$ denotes home-country exports of good y and $M^{*i}(p^{*i}, p^w)$ represents foreign-country- i imports of good y . The market-clearing requirement for good y is then implied by (1) and (2).

The First-Order Conditions

My math is awesome!!!

- Differentiating

$$\log A_t = (1 - \rho) \log A^* + \rho \log A_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$

$$\begin{aligned} L &= E_t \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^i [U(C_{t+i}) - V(N_{t+i})] \\ &+ E_t \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^i \lambda_{t+i} [A_{t+i} K_{t+i-1}^{\alpha} N_{t+i}^{1-\alpha} + (1 - \delta) K_{t+i-1} - C_{t+i} - K_{t+i}] \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} U(C_t) - V(N_t) + \lambda_t (A_t K_{t-1}^{\alpha} N_t^{1-\alpha} - C_t - K_t + (1 - \delta) K_{t-1}) \\ + \beta E_t [\lambda_{t+1} (A_{t+1} K_t^{\alpha} N_{t+1}^{1-\alpha} + (1 - \delta) K_t)] \end{aligned}$$

- We get following first-order conditions:

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial C_t} : U'(C_t) - \lambda_t = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial K_t} : -\lambda_t + \beta E_t \left[\lambda_{t+1} \left(\alpha \frac{Y_{t+1}}{K_t} + 1 - \delta \right) \right] = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial N_t} : -V'(N_t) + (1 - \alpha) \lambda_t \frac{Y_t}{N_t} = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda_t} : A_t K_{t-1}^{\alpha} N_t^{1-\alpha} - C_t - K_t + (1 - \delta) K_{t-1} = 0$$

Table 5The determinants of SO₂, CO₂, and BOD emissions per capita (differenced GMM).

Variable	SO ₂ (Protocol)	SO ₂	CO ₂ (Protocol)	CO ₂	BOD (Protocol)	BOD
$\ln E_{it-1}$	0.67*** (70.81)	0.68*** (90.02)	0.60*** (31.72)	0.60*** (28.38)	0.57*** (26.73)	0.58*** (21.52)
S	1.10*** (7.82)	1.11*** (7.77)	0.82*** (6.95)	0.84*** (6.21)	-0.79*** (-4.91)	-0.95*** (-6.96)
S ²	-0.907*** (-8.33)	-0.96*** (-15.62)	-0.43*** (-5.47)	-0.42*** (-4.63)	-0.20** (-2.02)	-0.14* (-1.94)
K/L	0.013 (0.32)	0.028 (0.7)	0.079** (2.13)	0.078** (2.17)	0.17*** (4.91)	0.22*** (7.24)
(K/L) ²	-0.031*** (-3.66)	-0.033*** (-5.56)	-0.014*** (-3.52)	-0.013*** (-3.63)	-0.043*** (-10.57)	-0.045*** (-9.81)
(K/L)S	0.27*** (5.22)	0.28*** (8.94)	0.095*** (3.16)	0.089*** (2.72)	0.21*** (6.1)	0.20*** (6.76)
T	0.0014*** (4.33)	0.0018*** (7.96)	0.0024*** (14.41)	0.0026*** (20.93)	0.0005 (1.43)	0.00050* (1.9)
T relative (K/L)	-0.0013* (-1.66)	-0.0016** (-2.37)	-0.0014*** (-2.65)	-0.0014** (-2.55)	-0.0039*** (-5.77)	-0.0048*** (-6.41)
T relative (K/L) ²	0.0011*** (4.19)	0.0011*** (6.12)	0.00066*** (5.92)	0.00064*** (6.42)	0.0017*** (6.32)	0.0019*** (5.99)
T relative S	-0.0010* (-1.79)	-0.0011** (-2.27)	-0.00059* (-1.83)	-0.00065* (-1.76)	0.0018*** (4.24)	0.0023*** (5.45)
T relative S ²	0.00074*** (8.01)	0.00075*** (12.18)	0.00037*** (4.6)	0.00036*** (4.21)	0.00023** (2.11)	0.00017*** (3.13)
T rel (K/L) rel S	-0.0015*** (-6.07)	-0.0015*** (-11.00)	-0.00077*** (-4.49)	-0.00074*** (-4.48)	-0.0013*** (-5.14)	-0.0013*** (-6.07)
Helsinki Protocol	-0.097*** (-4.01)	-	-	-	-	-
Oslo Protocol	-0.040*** (-2.93)	-	-	-	-	-
Kyoto Protocol	-	-	-0.0025 (-0.60)	-	-	-
Protocol on Water and Health	-	-	-	-	-0.010 (-1.20)	-
Constant	-0.0067*** (-11.22)	-0.0067*** (-9.06)	0.0012*** (3.14)	0.0010*** (3.27)	-0.0014** (-2.55)	-0.0010 (-1.41)
Observations	2152	2152	2152	2152	1159	1159
Number of countries	88	88	88	88	83	83
Sargan test	76.29	75.99	76.27	79.84	70.39	67.46
AR(1)	-4.41***	-4.44***	-3.45***	-3.52***	-3.27***	-3.38***
AR(2)	-0.01	-0.02	-0.94	-0.94	1.74*	1.75*

Note: Values in parentheses are t-values. *, ** and *** indicate "significant" at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level, respectively. Trade openness, per capita GDP, and its square term are instrumented for using predicted openness, predicted per capita GDP, and predicted its square term, respectively.

Source: Managi et al. (2009)

After the Presentation

- Answer audience questions succinctly
- No bluffing.....
- Finish when moderator says you are done
- Thank audience
- Stay for other speakers
- Engage audience members afterwards