Joyce J. Chen, Ph.D.

(with Katrina Kosec and Valerie Mueller)

In this paper, we investigate what drives temporary versus permanent internal migration using a unique panel survey of rural households in Pakistan spanning 27 years (1986-2013). The economics literature largely fails to distinguish temporary and permanent migrants, and rather consolidates them into a single category. However, temporary migrants typically retain direct decision-making power within the origin household. This non-monetary linkage is likely to influence a broad spectrum of allocation decisions, ranging from saving and investment to children’s education and occupational choice. Moreover, given this linkage, permanent and temporary migrants likely have disparate motives for migrating—resulting in differing degrees of responsiveness to economic and social conditions, and different patterns of selection. We model migrant selection using a linear probability model with separate regressions for permanent and temporary migration. We incorporate village and time fixed effects and current and historical markers of labor market potential, including ability, skills, and work experience.

Economic Development and Cultural Change, forthcoming. (with Richard Akresh and Charity Moore)

Altruism towards others can inhibit cooperation by increasing the utility players expect to receive in a non-cooperative equilibrium. To test this, we examine agricultural productivity in West African polygynous households. We find cooperation, as evidenced by more efficient production, is greater among co-wives than among husbands and wives. Using a game-theoretic model, we show this outcome can arise because co-wives are less altruistic towards each other than towards their husbands. We present a variety of robustness checks, which suggest results are not driven by selection into polygyny, greater propensity for cooperation among women, or household heads enforcing others’ cooperative agreements.

Review of Development Finance, 2(1), 9-21, March 2012. (with Emilio Hernandez and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega)

The literature suggests CCTs and remittances may protect poor households from income risk. We present a theoretical framework that explores how this ‘insurance’ effect can change households’ decision to apply for a loan via changes in credit demand and supply. Empirical evidence from poor rural households in Nicaragua shows CCTs did not affect loan requests while remittances increased them. The risk protection provided by remittances seems stronger, relative to CCTs, such that improvements on borrowers’ expected marginal returns to a loan or on creditworthiness more than offset decreasing returns to additional income. This suggests those transfers that best protect households from income risk favor financial deepening in the context of segmented markets.